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HTB | Certified

Machine - https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/Certifiedarrow-up-right

Machine Information - As is common in Windows pentests, you will start the Certified box with credentials for the following account: Username: judith.mader Password: judith09

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NMAP

└─$ nmap -sC -sV -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,3268,3269,5985,9389,49667,49689,49690,49691,49720,49741,49776 10.10.11.41 -Pn -oA nmap_port_details
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( <https://nmap.org> ) at 2025-08-09 12:54 IST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.41
Host is up (0.59s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-08-09 14:24:54Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: certified.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.certified.htb, DNS:certified.htb, DNS:CERTIFIED
| Not valid before: 2025-06-11T21:04:20
|_Not valid after:  2105-05-23T21:04:20
|_ssl-date: 2025-08-09T14:26:35+00:00; +7h00m04s from scanner time.
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: certified.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.certified.htb, DNS:certified.htb, DNS:CERTIFIED
| Not valid before: 2025-06-11T21:04:20
|_Not valid after:  2105-05-23T21:04:20
|_ssl-date: 2025-08-09T14:26:35+00:00; +7h00m04s from scanner time.
3269/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: certified.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2025-08-09T14:26:33+00:00; +7h00m03s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.certified.htb, DNS:certified.htb, DNS:CERTIFIED
| Not valid before: 2025-06-11T21:04:20
|_Not valid after:  2105-05-23T21:04:20
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49689/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49690/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49691/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49720/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49741/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49776/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2025-08-09T14:25:57
|_  start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: mean: 7h00m03s, deviation: 0s, median: 7h00m03s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   3:1:1: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 126.55 seconds

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SMB

We do not have permission to view any interesting shares

We can get the user list

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Bloodhound

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Foothold/shell

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Shell as management_svc

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WriteOwner

On analysing the Bloodhound result, we know:

JUDITH.MADER@CERTIFIED.HTB -> WriteOwner -> MANAGEMENT@CERTIFIED.HTB

and MANAGEMENT_SVC@CERTIFIED.HTB -> MemberOf -> MANAGEMENT@CERTIFIED.HTB

So we will set JUDITH.MADER@CERTIFIED.HTB as the group owner of MANAGEMENT@CERTIFIED.HTB

Next, I need to give judith.mader the full control over the groups:

Let’s add ourselves

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GenericWrite

Since Management have GenericWrite over Management_svc we can either use Targeted Kerberos or shadow credentials

We will be doing Shadow Credential to get the hash

Since Management_svc is a Member Of Remote Management Users we can winrm

and we are in and got the user.txt

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Privilege Escalation

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GenericAll

Now we can use shadow credentials to get the hash for the CA_operator

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ESC 9

we found ESC9

ESC9 vulnerabilities arise when a certificate template is explicitly configured not to include the szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2) security extension in the certificates it issues. This extension, which contains the requester's SID, was introduced by Microsoft as part of the May 2022 "Certifried" updates (CVE-2022-26923 and KB5014754) to enable "strong certificate mapping". Strong mapping allows DCs to reliably and securely map a presented client certificate to a specific user or computer account in Active Directory using its SID.

ESC9 can be exploited in a couple of primary ways:

  1. With UPN Manipulation (in Compatibility Mode or Disabled Mode)

  2. Combined with ESC6 (CA allows SAN specification)

We will use 1st method

Step 1: Read initial UPN of the victim account (Optional - for restoration).

Step 2: Update the victim account's UPN to the target administrator's sAMAccountName.

Since management_svc had GenericAll over ca_operator, which means full control over that AD object. That includes the ability to Change userPrincipalName

Step 3: Request a certificate as the "victim" user from the ESC9 template.

Step 4: Revert the "victim" account's UPN

Step 5: Authenticate as the target administrator.

Now i can winrm via hash and get the root.txt

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